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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER - AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT AcT The declared policy of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 was to raise the purchasing
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power of agricultural commodities and, at the same time, to protect the interest
of the consumer.1 The Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to issue orders
which, in his belief, based upon a consideration of evidence introduced at a
public hearing,2 would tend to effectuate this policy. Certain minimum requirements as to the provisions of the orders were imposed.8 For any order to be
effective, it must have been approved by a proportion of the producers of the
commodity concemed.4 Pursuant to the provisions of this act, an order was
issued regulating the handling of milk in the New York. metropolitan area. In
the suit for a mandatory injunction to force compliance with the terms of this
order, the defense was raised that the act involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, both to the secretary and to the commodity producers.
Held, that the delegation of authority was within reasonable limits and was,
therefore, permissible. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307
U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939).
The principle that legislative authority may not be delegated has been considered fundamental in our system of government. 5 Practical problems, however,
have produced a considerable modification of constitutional theory. In approving
examples of undoubted legislative delegation, most courts have frankly admitted
that a certain amount of such delegation is both necessary and proper. 6 But it is
agreed that the legislature may not abdicate its policy-making function. A
standard must be set 7- a framework within which the executive discretion may
1 " • • • establish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities
a purchasing power ••• equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities
in the base period ••• (2) to protect the interest of the consumer••••" Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. L. 247, amending Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. L. 31, 7 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 602.
2 Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended by 49 Stat. L. 754 (1935), 7 U.S. C.
(Supp. 1938), § 608c(4).
8 Every order must include one or more of four specified conditions, ibid., §
608c(7); any order affecting milk must contain one or more of seven conditions, ibid.,
§ 608c(5). The subject matter of the orders is restricted to a few named commodities.
Ibid., § 6o8c( 2).
4 Two-thirds of the producers of the commodity, in point of number or of
volume of production. Ibid., § 6o8c(8), (9).
5 1 CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 224 (1927); Field v. Clark,
143 U. S. 649 at 692, 12 S. Ct. 495 (1891).
6 "The essential facts upon which courts • • . agree is that there is an overpowering necessity for a modification of the doctrine of separation and non-delegation
of powers of government." Rosenberry, J., in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau
v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472 at 498, 220 N. W. 929 (1928). See also Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 at 406, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1927); Union Bridge
Co. v. United.States, 204 U.S. 364 at 387, 27 S. Ct. 367 (1906). Often, however,
the courts attempt to reconcile their decisions with the principle of nondelegation.
"Congress was merely conferring administrative functions. • • ." United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 at 516, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1910). "The true distinction,
therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make the law • • • and conferring
an authority ••• as to its execution ••••" Ranney, J., in Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R.
v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 at 88.
7 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935);
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function. There is no pattern of required elements which such a standard must
co11tain. The statutory language is important but not controlling; vague, general
terms which may provide a sufficient criterion in one case may be unsatisfactory
in another. 8 Ordinarily, words of a definite, well-recognized meaning are
required; D but it .is possible that a standard may be implied where none is
specifically stated.10 Various factors must be considered.11 The background of
the statute,12 its subject matter,18 and the agency to which the authority is to be
delegated H are elem1:;,nts of possible significance. Importance is also attached to
the presence in the statute of provisions requiring the agency to give notice
and hearing, and to make specific findings justifying its action.15 But even
though a court is able to find that the legislature has provided adequate guideposts, the fact often remains that an almost unlimited discretion is given to the
executive.18 For this reason, the granting of an extensive rule-making power to
the Secretary of Agriculture would not seem to necessitate a condemnation of
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1934); Holgate Bros.
v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A. 672 (1938).
8 The phrase, "to rehabilitate industry," did not provide a standard, in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 at 538, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935); but
"public interest'' was an adequate criterion in New York Central Securities Co. v.
United States, 287 U. S. 12 at 24, 53 S. Ct. 45 (1932).
D "Natural marketing area," State v. Auclair, (Vt. 1939) 4 A. (2d) 107; "unit''
(labor bargaining), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Board, 280 N. Y. 194, 20 N. E. (2d) 390 (1939).
10 Mayo v. Texas Co., (Fla. 1939) 188 So. 206 at 208. Power to make rules was
construed to mean "reasonable rules ••• to effectuate the purposes of the act."
11 "Between the extremes of adequate standards and no standards, there is a
twilight zone in which each case must be appraised. • • ." Chapman v. Huntington,
W. Va., Housing Authority, (W. Va. 1939) 3 S. E. (2d) 502 at 511.
12 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1903); a limitation on
the delegated power was found in the legislative history of the statute.
18 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U. S.
266 at 285, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1932). Power to grant licenses "as public convenience,
interest or necessity requires" upheld. "The [power] is to be interpreted by its context,
by the natur~ of radio transmission and • • • the scope • • • of services. • • .''
H The fact that the agency is already governed by an adequate code would seem
important; broad delegations to the Interstate Commerce Commission have been
sustained. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88,
33 S. Ct. 185 (1912); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S.
12, 53 S. Ct. 45 (1932).
15 Panama ·Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1934). In
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 at 541, 55 S. Ct. 837
(1935), the lack of "appropriate administrative procedure" is noted by the Court.
The inclusion of this requirement in the statutes has been generally approved by the
courts. Jersey Maid Milk Products v. Brock, 13 Cal. (2d) 620, 91 P. (2d) 577
(1939); McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 600 (1938);
Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S. E. 897 (1938).
·
16 United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. I (1926),
power given to the President to regulate the disposition of enemy property; Conway
v. New Hampshire Water Resources Board, (N. H. 1938) 199 A. 83, power to
designate and construct projects for the utilization of water power.
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the statute involved in the principal case.11 The declaration of policy which he
must consider, the requirement of written findings, and the restrictions imposed
on the orders which he may issue are checks on the exercise of the secretary's
power. Viewed in the light of precedent, these provisions seem to furnish a
satisfactory, legislative standard.18 And since further limitations might reduce
the flexibility of the act and thus impair its effectiveness, policy reasons would
also seem to support the Court's decision. A further question is raised as to the
delegation of authority to private individuals. As a general rule, such delegation
has met with judicial disfavor.19 Exceptions have been made, however, the
decisions being rationalized on various grounds. 20 The Court, in the principal
case, upholds the producer-referendum provisions, apparently reasoning that
the vote is merely an event, the occurrence of which gives effectiveness to the
11 But see, to the contrary, dissent of Roberts, J., in H. P. Hood & Sons v. United
States, 307 U. S. 588 at 604, 59 S. Ct. 1019 (1939).
18 Several factors distinguish the principal case from Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1934), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935), where unconstitutional delegations of
power were found. By contrast to the specific statement of purpose contained in the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, with
which those cases were concerned, declared an extremely vague policy aimed at the
general rehabilitation of industry. Nor did the latter statute burden the executive
with any restrictions comparable to the minimum requirements for the secretary's
orders, set forth in the former. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the President's
regulatory power was completely unchecked; and in the Schechter case the only
limitation on the executive was that he act "to effectuate the policy of the Act."
The Schechter case is further distinguishable in that, there, the President's authority
extended throughout the entire field of industry, whereas in the principal case the
secretary was confined to the regulation of specified agricultural commodities. Another
point of dissimilarity between the cases lies in the fact that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act required that the promulgation of orders be preceded by adequate
notice and opportunity for public hearing, while the National Industrial Recovery
Act prescribed no definite administrative procedure to be employed by the President.
Under this latter statute, the President could, and undoubtedly did, in the press of
emergency, approve proposed codes after only cursory examination. In contrast, the
record of the principal case shows that hearings were held by the secretary from
May 16, 1938, to June 7, 1938, that some three thousand pages of testimony were
taken, and that twenty briefs were filed by interested parties.
111 I CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIOAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 239-340 (1927); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1935); Maryland Co-Op. Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Miller, 170 Md. 81, 182 A. 432 (1936), noted in 34 M1cH. L.
REV. 1240 (1936); annotation, 76 A. L. R. 1053 (1932).
20 The most common explanation is that the popular approval is a mere contingency or event, so that no delegation of legislative power is involved. Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379 (1938); Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers
Confederation, (Ga. 1939) 3 S. E. (2d) 705. If the action of the individuals is
advisory only, there is no delegation of authority. Associated Industries of Oklahoma
v. Industrial Welfare Commission, (Okla. 1939) 90 P. (2d) 899. The so-called local
option laws are considered as exceptions to the usual rule, justified because of special,
local interest. 1 COOLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 245 (1927).
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already complete order. 21 The result obtained seems satisfactory; but it is submitted that more persuasive argument would have been based squarely on the
policy considerations in favor of giving to farmers a voice in their own regulation.
Edward S. Biggar

21 This is the reasoning of Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I, 59 S. Ct. 379 (1938),
which is cited as authority. The Court makes no additional comment upon this
question.

